Defamation on the Internet

Defamation is a tort. The internet has raised new issues in this established area of the law. This article views the issue as it was approached by two different courts.

The proliferation of the Internet over the last few years has added a new dimension to the world of communication and media. Not only does the Internet provide endless sources of information for the general public, it also provides members of public the opportunity to become a source of information themselves. Web-boards, websites, listservs and chat rooms are only a few of the cyber-forums where anyone with Internet access can share their opinions and publish statements of fact.

While this publishing opportunity can be exciting and helpful for those interested in communicating an idea, the issue of anonymous speech on the Internet has created some complications in the established tort of defamation. Internet forums typically involve dialogue between anonymous or pseudo-anonymous individuals, making it difficult for would-be plaintiffs in defamation cases to know who to sue or even how to sue them. Many defendants in Internet defamation actions claim that revealing their identity for the purpose of a defamation suit is not necessary and, in fact, is a violation of their right to free speech under the First Amendment. This iBrief will discuss two approaches recently taken by two different courts in response to this issue.

The Technology

 Many Internet forums are conducive to anonymous posting. "Screen names" act as pseudonyms and provide The Internet & Libel - The Debate

 While defamation since the Sullivan case has become an increasingly more defined and established tort, the introduction of the Internet and its anonymity-based forums for discussion have created a new wrinkle in the administration of defamation actions.  Few plaintiffs want to sue an anonymous defendant for libel. From a practical standpoint, discovery becomes a nightmare. Speakers are able to defame an individual or company and hide behind the anonymity of a "screen name" unless a judge orders their identities revealed. The resulting cost to the plaintiff can be far above what it would be in a case where the speaker was identified. Sometimes, if the speaker’s identity were revealed, plaintiffs would not judge the lawsuit worthy of their time or of their money. For instance, a judge who is defamed by an individual whom she sentenced to a prison might not feel the need to obtain a libel judgment against him to clear her name. The fact that the speaker is likely to have a grudge against her speaks for itself. And finally, the fault element becomes infinitely harder to prove, if not impossible, when the speaker’s identity is unknown.

  On the other side of the debate, speakers cloaked in aliases claim that anonymous speech has traditionally been protected by the First Amendment, and that revealing the identities of the Internet speakers for the purpose of libel suits would not only chill speech in the United States, but also subject the speakers to harassment by political or economic superiors before a successful claim of libel has even been proven.

Case Law

 In the last few years, Internet libel suits involving anonymous statements have begun cropping up in courtrooms across the country. The two notable cases discussed below exhibit different approaches to solving the problems presented by anonymous libel on the Internet. One seems to provide a satisfying solution while the other creates practical problems that undermine the tort of defamation all together.

Melvin v. Doe

  In November 2000, the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, PA, held that if the plaintiff could prove the identity of defendant was "(1) material, relevant, and necessary, (2) cannot be obtained by alternative means, and (3) is crucial to plaintiff’s case," the First Amendment would not protect the anonymity of the defendant.¹⁴ In Melvin v. Doe, an unknown person published statements on a website that accused a local judge of political activity that was inappropriate for a judge in her position.¹⁵ The plaintiff sued the unknown speaker for defamation and tried to obtain his identity during discovery.¹⁶ The defendant petitioned the court for a protective order that would prevent this discovery.¹⁷ However, the order was denied.¹⁸ The court reasoned that a state’s interest in discouraging defamatory statements about public officials by traditional media extended to statements made on the Internet. It held that because of this interest, there was no absolute immunity for Internet speakers with regard to the defamation tort.¹⁹ The court then applied the three-part test discussed above to the request for the speaker’s identity.²⁰ Without much discussion about the test’s application to the specific facts of the case, the court held that the plaintiff’s interest outweighed the defendant’s, and the protective order should be denied.²¹

The Ampex case

While the Melvin case was decided in 2000, more recently, a judge in California took a different approach to the Internet anonymity question. The Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled that plaintiffs in libel actions must prove that the allegedly libelous statement is in fact libelous before the identity of the speaker will be revealed.²² In this case, the plaintiff, Ampex, asked the judge to reveal the identity of an Internet speaker who posted anonymous messages about the company and its executives. Ampex claimed the messages were defamatory and said it needed the identity of the speaker so the lawsuit could proceed.²³ The judge rejected this request and gave Ampex a week to prove the statements were libelous before the plaintiff could obtain the speaker’s identity.²⁴

Analysis

  While the Melvin balancing-test approach to anonymous speech on the Internet and libel actions might create extra work for a libel plaintiff before he can successfully proceed with a defamation action, it is certainly preferable to the more recent Ampex approach. Proving libel before receiving the identity of the defendant is practically problematic, if not impossible. Although the plaintiff could potentially prove publication, identification of himself within the statement, defamatory content, falsity and injury, proving a fault standard without the identity of the plaintiff is a daunting task. Actual malice is a subjective determination of the publisher’s state of mind with regard to the falsity of his statement at the time of publication, and the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff has a right to inquire into that state of mind.²⁵ It is not difficult to see that without knowing who the defendant actually is in a libel suit how problematic or impossible it would be to prove the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the publication. Even negligence would be difficult to prove under the same circumstances. The Ampex approach seems almost a ridiculous answer to a very important question. Perhaps the court could require proof simply that the message held defamatory content, caused injury, identified the plaintiff and was false, but requiring proof that the complete tort of defamation occurred is asking too much.

Conclusion

 The tort of defamation has become a well-established area of law over the last few decades. With the advent and success of the Internet, a piece of this established tort has become more complicated. Ultimately, when dealing with the identity of anonymous Internet speakers in defamation actions, the approach in Melvin v. Doe is a better solution than the one advanced in Ampex. Perhaps in Melvin, the court had an easier call to make with regard to identity because the plaintiff had already proven other elements of the defamation tort, falsity, defamatory content and injury. However, the three-part test applied in Melvin is ultimately a more practical and thoughtful approach that allows a court to find a balance between the rights of the speaker to speak freely and the right of plaintiffs to recover for defamation without placing the plaintiff in an overly burdensome, if not paradoxical, position of proof.